National Firearms Association ANALYSIS OF THE LIBERAL "ACTION PLAN ON FIREARMS CONTROL" INTRODUCTION: The proposals contained in "The Government's Action Plan on Firearms control are frighteningly naive. Based on unproven theories, they do not stand up to analysis. The thinking is about at this level: "If we do this, it might have a good effect, so let's do it!" It is quite obvious that no serious attempt has been made to look at the other possibility: The bad effects that can confidently be expected from legislation so badly designed. In this paper, we will try to redress that lack of forethought. Conclusions of Chief Inspector Colin Greewood, West Yorkshire Constabulary (writing in Police Review, Britain) after he had done a six-month study at Cambridge Unlverslty of firearms control methods and their actual (as opposed to theoretical) effects in many countries: At first glance, it may seem odd or even perverse to suggest that statutory controls on the private ownership of firearms are irrelevant to the problem of armed crime: yet that is precisely what the evidence shows. Armed crime and violent crime generally are products of ethnic and social factors unrelated to the availability of a particular type of weapon. The number of firearms required to satisfy the crime market is small, and these are supplied no matter what controls are instituted. Controls have had serious effects on legitimate users of firearms, but there is no case, either in the history of this country or in the experience of other countries in which controls can be shown to have restricted the flow of weapons to criminals, or in any way reduced crime. Our own studies have confirmed that assessment. Conclusions of Mr. Justice Gibbs, Supreme Court of BC, 1986, in Hurley v. Dawson (Dawson had refused Hurley a permit whlch would have cost Hurley his job, for a non-violent marijuana offence.): This is a difficult case. Not the least of the difficulties is due to the tortuous language of the gun control provisions of the Criminal Code. In Regina versus Neil, Judge Gordon was moved, with some justification, to refer to those provisions as "one of the most horrifying examples of bad draftsmanship that I have had tbe misfortune to consider", as "so convoluted that even those responsible for enforcing the provisions are apparently unable to understand them" and as "a challenge to one's sense of logic." An example of the problems Mr Justice Gibbs complained about. Criminal Code 91.(4.1): Subsection (2) does not apply to a person to whom a permit to possess a particular restricted weapon has been issued under subsection 110 (1) where the person is not the person mentioned in the registration certificate issued in respect of the restricted weapon, when the person to whom the permit has been issued possesses the restricted weapon at the place authorized by the permit. And now the Liberals propose to make everythlng more expensive, more complex, and challenge our sense of logic once again. In combatting such proposals, the best method is to analyze them. With even a little thought, you can predict bad effects the new laws will have. Explain them, and you have gone a long way toward persuading your listener that such laws should not be enacted. Stick to common sense and basic principles. Above all, remember always that this is a political question, not a crime question. This is the Liberal Partyattacking the recreational firearms community (RFC). Nothing ln the package is a really good way to reduce crime or improve public safety. The proposals do much, however, to wreck the RFC. Canada would be far better served by refusing this package entirely, sending the Minister back with instructions from Parliament to take a clean sheet of paper and start over. Any discussion over the merits of some part, or discussion about some minor modification to some part or other, results in a shift of battlefield from "This packaqe should be rejected" to "Now we're arguing over the petty details, with the implication that the bulk of it is all right." That's the field they want; let's not let them fight on that field. Let's use a field we choose. We should take every opportunity to portray this as a struggle between the recreational firearms community (RFC) and the Liberal Party! If the Liberals can successfully claim that this is a battle over guns and gun control, they will win it. If we can demonstrate that we are taking it as an attack by the Liberals, an attack that we can and will fight politically in the political arena, we can win. They don't want to fight on that field. We should continuously publicize the fact that this is a re-play of Kim Campbell: New rookie MP given Minister of Justice job; Minister expects to make big splash and become next Prime Minister; Minister persuades Party to attack RFC because "the majority of Canadians are anti-gun" and "any losses will be more than compensated by attracting the anti-gun majority" into supporting the Party. In Campbell's case, that was followed by total failure of her predictions and the death of her Party. We should continuously publicize the fact that the Liberals are re-playing what happened to Campbell: RFC abandons Conservative Party; RFC flocks into Reform Party; "anti-gun majority" ignores Kim Campbell's efforts, does not flock to support Conservatives. The RFC should not give its support to any political Party, but it should move and maneuver politically. Every Party should be aware that the RFC is a huge and important voting bloc, composed largely of voters seeking political representation who will change the way they vote over a firearms control issue. As the "anti-firearms majority" demonstrated in the last federal election their voters will not switch to another party over a firearms control issue. They did not switch to supporting Campbell or her Party--and her Party now has 2 MPs. No one knows what fraction of what happened to Kim Campbell and her Party was caused by those factors--but some of it was. Our analysis indicates that a 1arge fraction of it was, and every line of print or broadcast comment that mentions those factors will add to the already-high resistance to Alan Rock within his own Party. And that is valuable. It can kill his Bill. In firearms control law, we have been putting "patches on the patches" for over 60 years--and nothing has worked. Our crime levels are higher than they have ever been before. Criminals have no difficulty in getting illegal firearms, and nothing in the Liberal proposa1 seems likely to change that. It is important that we are dealing with a government that is being forced to slash spending. The proposals are very expensive, and their cost-effectiveness level is miserably bad, so they are quite difficult to justify in the budget. Firearms control is a joint federal-provincial-municipal matter, with heavy and costly overlapping. We should do everything we can to persuade them to reduce costs by streamlining the system. In particular, we should be persuading provincial and municipal governments to recover the funds, personnel and space currently dedicated to the firearms registration system by turning the whole thing over to the federal government. It is federal law. Each level of government is currently trying to prove that it is cutting costs, and each is vigorously pushing the bills towards other levels of government for payment. Firearms control law is federal law, therefore the federal government should be forced to pay for it--office space, personnel wages, cost of operations-- the works. The feds, of course, want the provinces to pay, operate the system, and incur the liabilities. As you will see below, the federal government is trying to get well over $600 million worth of new bureaucracy up and running at a cost to itself of $85 million spread over 5 years. If we can persuade the provincial and municipal governments to reject the huge bills being dropped into their laps, that will be a major deterrent to theBill's passage. If the provincial and municipal governments insist that the federal government run everything through its own offices, using its own people and computers and pay allthe bills, that will force Mr. Rock to apply for the whole $6OO million instead of $85 million over 5 years. It will signiflcantly reduce his chances of success--starting an unseemly brawl within the Liberal Party. Some arguments to use: The cost of firearms contro1 for handguns is already quite high, and the current Liberal proposals will increase the bills by a factor of at least 6, and more 1ikely 20. Handgun registration has not reduced handgun violent crime, handgun suicide, handqun homicide, or kept handguns out of the hands of violent criminals. It is a 60-year-old proven failure. While the Feds may promise to pick up the additional costs, all provinces know from bitter experience that the feds have a habit of pulling out from under such commitments in a few years, leaving the provinces stuck with the entire costs. (That is also true of municipal-provincial relationships.) That is a particularly good argument at this time, because we are expecting heavy cuts in federal payments to provincial governments this spring. Neither level of government can afford these heavy new costs, and user-pay may not be possible within the Criminal Code--an area which the courts have not yet considered. There are good, sound legal arguments for the principle that user-pay cannot be used within the Criminal Code. They will be before the courts in 1995, and we may win. ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSALS: IMPORTATION CONTROL (P6-10): The Liberals propose improved control over legal shipments of firearms. They offer no evidence that the current control system is not functioning adequately. or that large numbers of firearms are being stolen from legal shipments. In fact, most of the crime firearms in Canada are smuggled in just like cigarettes, liquor and drugs, More chasing of legal shipments misuses scarce and costly police/Customs resources to attack the wrong area. It is not a cost effective idea. In these days of cost-cutting, we should be doing a better job of selecting the "biggest bang for the buck." PlO: "All individual firearms will be registered as they enter or leave Canada." The government has already been warned that this will severely reduce hunting-related tourism into Canada from the US, losing us a substantial part of the $842 million spent by US fish- and wildlife-based tourists (1991 Environment Canada figures) annually. Also, the bleeding off of $160 million (1991 caused by Canadians going to the US for similar purposes will undoubtedly rise, increasing net loss to the Canadian economy. This is an attack on the RFC because it hampers and damages the entire hunting, related services and related businesses industry. It adds cost to legally imported firearms without having any effect on smuggled firearms. The entire RFC is backinq the guides, outfitters, lodges and businesses that will be damaged by these proposals. The registration system, according to the Minister's own TR1994-9e report, is largely useless for tracing firearms and certainly is not cost-effective. The correct answer to the problem of smuggled guns is severe penalties for the the use of weapons (of any kind, not just quns) in violent crime so that criminals will not want to use weapons. CRIMINAL USE OF FIREARMS (P12-16): They propose severe mandatory minimum sentences for using a firearm or replica in crime. That legislation needs careful attention; there has been similar legislation on the books for many years (Criminal Code section 85), and the criminal justice system has consistently refused to use it. On 20 Sep 94, Garry Breitkreuz, MP, told the House of Commons that in 1991-92, the Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics recorded that out of 12,287 convictions for violent crimes, only 52 were for violation of s. 85. In 100 per cent of those 52 cases, the sentence was the minimum allowed. It is obvious that the criminal justice system is heavily Prejudiced against using such laws. Is this a smoke-and-mirrors proposa1? Legislation is useless if not used, and we have already proved the justice system's attitude toward this type of law. It is not that s. 85 is "Not easy to use... as [it] now stands." It is that prosecutors use firearms laws as plea-bargainlng chips, fail to lay or drop s. 85 charges early, and rarely apply s. 85 to actual gun-using violent criminals. The correct answer to the problem of violent crime is severe penalties for the use of weapons in violent crime whether those weapons are firearms or not. US statistics indicate strongly that victim death or injury are far more likely in cases where the weapon used is not a firearm, because the firearm allows distance between criminal and victim. Singling out firearms-- particularly where replica firearms are included--is naive. The ban on replica firearms is senseless. It pushes the criminals away from replicas-but toward real firearms, increasing the possibility of death or serious injury for the police and the victims. It is based on the embarrassment of the police when they shoot someone who is later found not to have a real firearm. It is the wrong solution. The real solution is to clearly grant immunity to each police officer for using force in situations where he is in a state of reasonable fear that death or serious bodily injury is about to be inflicted on him or someone under his protection. That pushes criminals away from replicas, real firearms, and all other types of weapon. This is an attack on the RFC because it criminalizes "failing to report losses or thefts" where the loss or theft was unknown, adds "conspiracy offences" which will be used against firearms collectors, and "mak[es] possible the confiscation of proceeds " which will be used against the RFC for paperwork errors. The RFC is well aware that this type of legislation is rarely if ever used against real criminals. It is reserved for use agalnst firearms owners when other charges can't be supported. NATIONAL FIREARMS REGISTRATION SYSTEM (P18-26): According to TR11994-9e, the Minister's "Review of Firearms Registratlon" report, the handgun registration system is riddled with errors and omissions. The database is a shambles, and the cost of running the system (at $82.69 per certificate issued times 83,913 issued in 1993) is least 6.9 million annually--for paper certificates. TR1994 recommends increasing the cost to $104.02 per certificate issued by standardizing on the Quebec system. TR1994 says much of the data in the system is "stale" (person dead, moved away, institutionalized or emigrated; firearm gone). The Liberals say the registration system is needed for "Tracklng firearms used in crime." TR1994 says that 100 traces per year are done, and "most tracing requests do not produce a positive trace." From that, there are less than 50 successful traces per year at a cost of ($6.9 million divided by 49 successful traces maxlmum) over $140,000 per successful trace. For that much money, we could hire 5 police officers for a year for cost of one successful trace. TR1994 does not say how many traces are part of a criminal investigation as opposed to traclng the latest mistake in processing. It seems 1ikely that the system creates most of its own work. Is that efficient? A "successful" trace includes one which tells the police that the firearm was stolen ten years ago, which is hardly useful data. To solve a crime through registration, the criminal's firearm must be in the hands of the police, but not the criminal. The firearm must be registered to the criminal (rare), and he must still reside at the same address he gave to register it. The system does not keep records of its successes in finding criminals. That's not surprising; such records are dangerous. They propose a new, 5-tiered Firearms Possession Certificate linked to the new computerized registration system. That is a very badly designed system. It cannot be made cost-effective, cannot be made user-pay, and cannot be made renewable by setting a fixed term, There are Charter reasons why that is true. The new registration certificate is plastic, and carries the same information in writing, on a magnetic stripe, and in a bar code. No reason is given for the high level of redundancy which is not cost-effective! It will be far more expensive to issue than the old paper certificate I but let's be generous: Let's say it costs only $100 to issue one. On P4, the Minister tells us that there are 7 million firearms in Canada, 1,2 million registered and 5.8 million not. To register 5.8 million will cost Canada $580 million. To re-register the other 1.2 million on the new cards, at least another $20 million. Total, $600 million; but Mr. Rock has said, loudly and often, that the cost to the federal government will be $85 million. The additional $515 million will have to come out of the provinces or be a user-pay system. Or does he intend to print it? Regardless of how it is divided, the proposal is to spend $600 million creat jobs for bureaucrats issuing certificates of registration. We have known for a long time that criminals ignore the registration system, using illegal firearms; therefore, the registered firearms are those held by the law-abiding That is not cost-effective for "reducing crime . " On P20, we are told that "Every firearm will be issued an attachable Firearms Identification Number" Marvelous. The criminals remove serial numbers from the guns to prevent tracing, so we will glue another number on the gun so we can still identify it. Did they actually read what they wrote? The new system requires new computer hardware, with communication to every police station and firearms store in Canada. It requires new, one-user-only software to uniquely identify every firearm in Canada from any terminal and tell where it is. The new hardware is to be bought, distributed and installed, and the new software is to be written, tested and debugged--all by O1 Jan 96. It seems unlikely that the plan will succeed. We have had registration of handguns since 1934, and it has not reduced or prevented handgun crime. It has pushed criminals away from handguns and toward rifles and shotguns, which are far deadlier than handguns. The predictable result is that more police and victims will be killed instead of injured. This proposal is an attack on the RFC because it involves heavy new costs for an ineffective and largely useless system, coupled with a determined effort to impose user-pay. There is no evidence that the costs will be justified by any good effect. The real intention is apparently to reduce or eliminate the private ownership of firearms. Apparently the Liberal party is afraid of Canadian voters. Why? What are they planning? INCREASED HANDGUN CONTROLS (P28-36): They began by recognizing "target shooting and collecting" as legitimate. Then they announced the outlawing of of the firearms used in 4 shooting events of the Canadian pistol team high performance competitive program for the male, female, and wheelchair teams. For collectors, 58 per cent of all registered handguns are scheduled for reduction to zero in value. Many of tht firearms outlawed are worth $10000 each or more. Whole collections of rare and costly historical artifacts are rendered valueless. Professor Terry Ursacki, of the University of Calgary, was one of the few who had a chance to speak directly to Mr. Rock. He pointed out that he, like many other collectors, regarded his firearms as investments. He had planned to liquidate a large part of his collection on his return from China to buy a home-- but when he arrived, Mr. Rock's announcements had ruined his investments , and his firearms were rendered valueless. His comment was fair: "Mr. Rock, you have stolen my home . " ' Insofar as it will have any effect at all on criminals, it will push them away from the feeble .25 and .32 handguns and towards deadlier more powerful handguns. The predictable result is that more pollce and victims will be killed instead of injured. Apparently, the Minister's office is so out of touch with the real world that he had no idea what his legislation would do. These proposals are an attack on the RFC because they are destroying valuable collections, ruining people who have their life savings invested in firearms ( many of which, until Mr. Rock arrived, were appreciating faster than government bonds), and preventing young people from becoming involved in the RFC. It now costs too much for the average young person to take up a shooting sport, and the result is clear already. The government's failure to impose a cost-effective control system has created a massive smuggler's market. "Street guns" are cheap and getting cheapeer; legal firearms are expensive and getting steadily more expenslve. The additional costs of dealing with the paperwork, user-pay fees and bureaucracy to the young prevent clubs from recruiting the young, teaching them safety, and settling them in alifelong and safe hobby. Instead, many now buy street guns, get no safety training, and get into trouble with the law. The government's mandatory"Safety Training Course" has been so successful that clubs refuse legal unsupervised access to their shooting ranges until the graduates take club training. The Course is inadequate, riddled with safety errors, and full of wrong statements about what the law does or does not require. In many places, it tells students to commit criminal offences. You are safer on a shooting range, surrounded by people engaged in intense competition with loaded firearms, that you are at home in your own bathroom--according to standard insurance company risk assessments. $2 million liability coverage costs a hunter or target shooter--of any discipline--$4.50 per year. MILITARY AND PARAMILITARY FIREARMS (P38-46): These proposals are probably the death knell of registration in Canada. Kim Campbell converted firearms which were unrestricted to "restricted" status. Many people did not register the affected firearms, because they were afraid that some later government would convert them to "prohibited" status. They were right. Now those who obeyed the law are being penalized having the property rendered valueless not only those already mentioned but the owners of 58 per cent of all registered handsuns as well. It seems unlikely that future civil disobedlence will be severe. The "military and paramilitary" firearms affected are rarely if ever used by Canadian criminals. They are commonly owned and used by collectors and target shooters, who are outraged by the government's "theft" of their property. The omens for the future are ominous. It is widely known that the registration system cannot prove that any firearm registered before O1 Oct 92 has NOT been legally transferred into other hands. De facto deregistration of such firearms is very easy, and the idea is very attractive to those who feel cheated. There is burnlng resentment against the Liberal Party's policy of destroying the value of a previously law-abiding citizen's firearms! It is temptingly easy to sell affected firearms into the illegal underground marketplace, recouping a part of the loss. The entire program, as a way of starving the underground marketplace of guns, is incredibly counterproductive. The market for firearms is not eliminated by such laws. Only the very law-abiding can be disarmed by such tactics, so the real effects are minimal so far as criminals are concerned marginal so far as young people are concerned, and counterproductive in many ways, Such proposals make things worse, not better. There is also the fact that the Liberal Party proposes to confiscate some $130 million worth of legally~acquired private property without paying compensation. Many people are beglnning to wonder what other classes of property will be confiscated in like manner in the future. Is this the setting of precedent? NATIONAL HEADQUARTERS: EDITORIAL AND PUBLICATION: Box 1779 Box 4384, Station C Edmonton AB T5J 2P1 Calgary AB T2T 5N2 Canada Canada Tel: (403) 439-1394 Tel: (403) 640-1110