THE NATIONAL FIREARMS ASSOCIATION PRESENTATION ON  BILL C-68

Bill C-68 is a political and civil rights piece, not a Bill to improve
public safety.  It gives the public a false promise--the promise that
the Bill will improve public safety.

C-68 has nothing to do with crime control, protection of women,
reduction in accidents, or prevention of suicide.  It is simply an
attack on the recreational firearms community, designed to generate
favorable media coverage.

Existing law is often difficult to interpret and  administer. Even the
RCMP Crime Detection Laboratories are finding it impossible to say
which firearms and cartridges are "prohibited" and which are not.

C-68 makes things far worse, and it is abusive.  It would be simpler
and easier to start over, with a clean sheet of paper. We don't want
C-68 changed; we want it killed.

C-68 provides for the confiscation, without payment, of hundreds of
millions of dollars worth of private property.  It renders historical
artifacts and valuable collections worthless.  It wipes out the life
savings of many Canadians, rendering their collections valueless or
severely reducing their value.

C-68 does not provide compensation for those who are injured by it; it
attempts to ignore that issue entirely.  It seems unlikely that the
courts will go along with that approach.

It confiscates in clear and open violation of the law.  Peter W. Hogg
says, in "Constitutional Law of Canada" at 28.5(d):  "There is a rule
of statutory interpretation in Anglo-Canadian law that a statute which
takes private property is to be read as implicitly requiring that
compensation be paid to the private owner."

MPs should look at this problem before irrevocable harm is done. If
that is not done, Parliament may well have to pay a very large bill
when the courts finally rule on this issue.

C-68 contains ominous overtones of a police state mentality.  The
individuals who drafted it apparently regard Canadians as dangerous
persons, precariously held in check by threats.  The Bill clearly
violates the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, an d it ignores
rights which Canadians enjoy as a result of traditional liberties in a
free society.

Most of its attacks are directed at people who have done nothing
wrong.

C-68 reverses the burden of proof--a cherished part of criminal law in
every true democracy, including Canada.  Unlike earlier legislation,
C-68 requires the citizen to prove that the bureaucrat's decision is
wrong, instead of requiring the bureaucrat to prove that he is right
[FA s. 73(3) and CC s.  117.11].  In many cases, there is no right of
appeal at all; the bureaucrat's power is absolute.

C-68 vests police and firearms bureaucrats with extremely broad search
and seizure powers, authorizing them to enter and search the private
home of any Canadian who has a firearm or ammunition, or even a record
of a firearm or ammunition, including situations where no crime is
known or suspected [FA s. 99 and 101].

C-68 authorizes imprisoning anyone who refuses to help the authorities
search his home, or refuses to answer (before he has access to legal
counsel) any relevant question put to him [FA s. 100 and 107].  What
happened to the right to remain silent?

C-68 authorizes imposing a sentence of up to five years imprisonment
for expressing an opinion, even where the opinion is inadmissible as
evidence in a court of law [CC s. 107(3) and (1)].  What happened to
the right of free speech?

C-68 strips Parliament of virtually all of its authority in firearms
matters, placing all future legislation into the hands of the Minister
of Justice alone.  The scope of the authority delegated to the Minister
[by FA s. 110, 111 and 112] is huge.

Yes, we do realize that the wording gives that authority to "the
Governor in Council."  And you realize, as experienced Members of
Parliament and media people, that the Governor in Council is actually a
rubber stamp applied to the Minister's wishes.

Even Parliamentary scrutiny of what the Minister is doing will be lost
if C-68 passes.  While Parliamentary scrutiny is required by FA s. 111,
it is then immediately eliminated by FA s. 112.\par All of C-68 is
serious criminal law, with severe penalties for anyone who violates any
Order in Council (OIC) regulation.  It is unfortunate that Canadians
will be unable to learn what the law is, other than by subscribing to
the Canada Gazette.

C-68 is largely a licensing scheme.  In pith and substance, it is
designed as a method to control the activities of honest Canadians
engaged in recreational activities and using private property.  As
such, it may well be ultra vires of Parliament, because that type of
legislative power belongs to the provinces.

When firearms control was first put into the Criminal Code, it was
clearly a matter of public safety.  The refrain, "in the interests of
the safety of the applicant or any other person" held the key to every
situation.  The documents were few, permanent, and free.  That is no
longer true.

Now the documents are many, expire frequently, and cost up to several
hundred dollars.  Public safety is no longer primary.

While the firearms control system has been upheld in the past, today's
loss of focus on public safety and the drift into regulatory areas
probably will not stand the "pith and substance" test in the Supreme
Court of Canada.  Several provinces have indicated that they intend to
take it there.

The financial liabilities that the government has already incurred are
quite heavy.  By the time that C-68's legal status is resolved, the
liabilities may well be much heavier.

Between having to repay illegally-collected licensing fees and
compensate for private property taken or destroyed under invalid laws
and Orders in Council, the compensation to be paid may well be in the
hundreds of millions of dollars.  This is an area wor th exploring
carefully, for any MP who cares about the deficit.

For those interested in the Constitutional validity of charging
licensing fees within the Criminal Code, Peter W. Hogg's comment in
"Constitutional Law of Canada" is worth pursuing:  "The federal
Parliament, not being confined to direct taxation, can impose both
direct and indirect charges under its taxation power [Constitution s.
91(3)], but a federal regulatory charge, like a provincial regulatory
charge, may well have to fall under some head of regulatory power.
Thus, the distinction between taxes and charges may become relevant to
the validity of a federal law." [30.10(b)]

In short, this Bill is seriously flawed.  Canada can no longer afford
to spend hundreds of millions of dollars on unproven theories.  In our
two-page Paper III, "THE COST OF FIREARMS CONTROL REVISIONS," we show
that the actual cost of simply operating the system is over $600
million, even using only figures supplied by the Minister and the RCMP
Commissioner.  Can Canada afford to spend $600 million on C-68?

Yes, we know that the Minister says it will only cost $85 million.  He
should be asked to explain which parts of our analysis--or which of his
figures that we used--are in error.

Perhaps it helps to put things in perspective.  In 1991-92, 69 Canadian
women died in gunshot homicides.  4,038 Canadian women died of breast
cancer; 58 times as many as died from firearms.

The government has authorized $30 million to be spent on trying to
reduce the fatalities from breast cancer.  One wonders, if $600 million
is available, why it is not allocated to the larger problem, where even
a minor success would have far greater effects.  A 2 per cent
improvement in breast cancer fatalities would save more women's
lives--80 of them--than a 100 per cent improvement in gun fatalities.
Is C-68 wise use of resources?

In order to keep costs down, the Minister says that registration will
be done by owners, using postcards.  The result of that is predictable;
the error rates will be very high, and the already error-ridden system
will be swamped with more errors.

For example, about 20 per cent of the firearms in the RCMP's reference
collection have no serial numbers.  From New Zealand's experience,
people use a patent number, date, model number or any other number they
can find and report it as a serial number, eve n where the firearm has
a perfectly good serial number.

Under FA s. 102(1) and (3), every person who makes an error on the
postcard by giving his opinion on an obscure point of identification
can be sent to prison for up to five years if his opinion turns out to
be wrong.

Additionally, that method of entry means that no screening of
applicants will be done.  Since the alleged purpose of registration is
to keep firearms out of the hands of the unsuitable, it appears the
real purpose is not that which the government says it is.  If it were,
then the problem of automatic renewal would have been considered.

The basic principles of law regarding issuance, renewal and revocation
should be considered before voting on C-68.  They have very interesting
effects on this type of legislation.

The government said that it has no intention of using the registration
system to confiscate more firearms.  At about the same time, it
proposed the confiscation of nearly 600,000 registered firearms--almost
all without compensation.  Under the circumstances, it is easy to be
suspicious about intentions.

The members of the recreational firearms community are faced with a
hard choice.  We can register all our firearms, in which case we face
confiscation sooner or later.  C-68, in CC s. 84(1) "prohibited
firearm" (d) authorizes the Minister to convert every firearm in Canada
to "prohibited firearm" status, in terms which ensure that any appeal
to the courts would fail.

If it is not the government's intent to confiscate all those firearms,
why is that section in Bill C-68?  Why vest the Minister with powers
that he promises he will never use?

Under C-68, it is a criminal offence to possess any firearm [CC s.
91(1)]--but government will sell permission to commit that crime, in
the form of a license plus a registration certificate. It is a curious
perversion of the criminal law to define an action as so harmful to
society that doing it incurs a penalty of long imprisonment, then offer
to sell permission to do it.

Anyone who operates inside the system faces the risk that this, or any
future, Minister can issue an Order in Council, convert his property to
"prohibited" status, and confiscate it.

If he chooses to operate outside the system he is a criminal.  If he
chooses to operate inside it, he will become a victim.

The Department of Justice commissioned the research paper, "Review of
Firearms Registration TR1994-9e."  It demonstrates that registration
records often go "stale" and becomes meaningless.

This finding suggests that the proposed registration system is not
useful as a long-term crime-fighting tool.  Therefore, any registration
system can only be useful in the short term.

There is enough information available today to prove that the
registration system cannot be trusted.  By the end of 1995, we expect
that evidence from that system will be inadmissible in any court of
law, as a result of cases currently before the courts.

It is another example of legislation based on theory, with scientific
evidence carefully ignored.  Instead of carefully researched facts and
figures, you are being asked to judge C-68's registration system on the
basis of anecdotes and scare tactics.

For every positive effect that the Minister predicts for a C-68
provision, there is a negative effect that his Department has not told
anyone about.  These merit careful examination.

In his 1993 annual report, the Auditor General condemned the Department
for not doing a decent job of research.  He pointed out that the small
amount of biased research that had been done was both inadequate and
inaccurate.  He requested that more research be done.  It has not been
done.  It is still all theory, with a minimum of evidence as to the
actual results that will follow if it is enacted.

Terence Wade, the author of "Review of Firearms Registration
TR1994-9e," has not been invited to appear here.  One might ask why,
but it is probably because he reported widespread error, confusion and
inconsistencies in the present system.

William Bartlett of the Parliamentary Library wrote several excellent
papers on firearms control issues.  He has not been invited to appear
here.  One might ask why, but it is probably because he told both sides
of the story.

Professor H. Taylor Buckner of Concordia University in Quebec has done
a good deal of research on firearms control law matters.  He has not
been invited to appear here, although he requested an invitation.  One
might ask why.

Professor Garry Mauser of Simon Fraser University in British Columbia
has done a good deal of research on firearms control law matters.  He
has not been invited to appear here, although he requested an
invitation.  One might ask why.

When we asked why, the Clerk of the Committee answered that he thought
we would bring Professor Mauser with our delegation. Apparently,
someone hopes to confuse the issue by forcing neutral researchers to
appear with partisan groups, or not at all.

Looking at the list of those who were invited, it is hard not to
conclude that someone is deliberately keeping the best experts away
from your questions.  These hearing are scheduled to be saturated with
witnesses who have little knowledge or experience in firearms law or
firearms safety matters, while many experts are excluded for no
discernible reason.

The function of this Committee, as we understand it, is to improve the
legislation.  It is difficult to see how that can be done when the best
evidence is excluded.

"TR1994-9e" pointed out that, over 60 years, the RCMP has been unable
to make our existing registration system either cost effective or
accurate.  It is riddled with undetected errors. That report did not
enjoy wide circulation.  Now, incredibly, in Bill C-68 we see the
illogical conclusion: "If it doesn't work, make it bigger and spend
more money on it!"

The theory of firearms registration is simple:

1. Record seven characteristics of the firearm--make, model, caliber,
barrel length, etc.--to identify it as one of the group of firearms
sharing those seven characteristics.

2. Identify it uniquely by recording its serial number, which makes it
the only one with that number in that group.

3.  Record the possessor's name and address to locate it.

The truth about firearms registration is stark but unpalatable; it is
not possible to uniquely identify firearms by that method, or indeed by
any known method.

The result of that truth is roughly the same as it would be to learn
that fingerprints are not unique.  The value of the system for
identification in a court of law becomes negligible.

Clearly, that was known when the government issued the 30 Nov 94 paper,
"THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTION PLAN ON FIREARMS CONTROL."  That paper
described the "Firearms Identification Number (FIN)" system which would
replace serial numbers with genuinely unique numbers "attached" to each
firearm.

It quickly became obvious that the FIN idea was unworkable, so a new
paper was issued, also entitled "THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTION PLAN ON
FIREARMS CONTROL," apparently to replace the 30 Nov errors.  The
relevant parts of the 30 Nov version form our Paper XXII.

There is an old rule of computer processing: "Garbage in, garbage
out."  It means that if the data put into the computer is wrong, there
is no way for the computer to give correct answers.  You can buy a
bigger, faster, more expensive computer--but it cannot make the answers
come out right if the input data is wrong.

There are four major problems with registering firearms:

1.  The "correct" entries for the seven characteristics vary from local
registrar to local registrar; the degree of expertise required to
accurately identify firearms is not available at the Local Registrar
level.

2.  The seven identifying characteristics change when a particular
model is altered by the factory or is repaired after it has been sold.

3.  In many cases, the serial number is not unique; makers frequently
duplicate serial numbers on firearms within the same model group, or on
similar models which the system cannot identify as being different.

4.  Where the possessor moves or dies without notifying the system, his
record becomes trash.  It remains in the system but is meaningless.
All such errors are undetectable, other than by sending a policeman out
to physically check each firearm.

In sum, the registration system is not cost-effective.  It is riddled
with errors, and more undetectable errors accumulate every year.  There
is little chance of correction, because the faults lie at the heart of
the matter:  Much of the data entered into the system is inaccurate,
and much of the accurate data in the system becomes inaccurate as time
goes by.   Neither problem is correctable.

The cost of improving identification would be the cost of several years
of schooling for each Local Registrar--prohibitive.

The cost of checking the entire system is also prohibitive. That is why
the system has never been checked since it was initiated in 1934.  It
can only be checked by having an expert physically compare the firearm
with its registration certificate.

Unfortunately, even experts do not agree on what entries are correct
for each make and model of firearm.  What to enter for each of the
seven identifying fields is an insoluble problem; there are just too
many makes and models, all of which can be "correctly" identified by
using widely differing terms.

In our Paper VI, the NFA has described two simple tests which should be
run before expanding the registration system.  We have been asking for
those tests for many years, but the Department of Justice resolutely
refuses to run them.

It refuses to run them because they would prove what we say: At least
25 per cent of the existing registration records--covering over 300,000
firearms--are meaningless.

As "TR1994-9e" points out, only 100 traces are requested annually, and
less than half yield a positive result.

"TR1994-9e" is not an in-depth report, but it supports our view of the
registration system.  A more rigorous examination of the same subject
should be done before enacting C-68.

The system to transfer firearms described in the 30 Nov 94 paper "THE
GOVERNMENT ACTION PLAN ON FIREARMS CONTROL," is not related to the
system set forth in C-68.  The system in C-68 is, in our judgement,
unworkable.

For example, FA s. 22(a)(ii) requires the seller to "obtain the
authorization of the Chief Firearms Officer for the transfer" of any
firearm--but the CFO's procedure in FA s. 26 does not include supplying
it.  The procedure also fails to say when or how the physical transfer
of the firearm is done.  Other areas contain similar oversights.

As "TR1994-9e" points out, "Practices with regard to restricted weapons
apparently vary so widely across Canada, and even within a single
province, that it is impossible to describe a typical registration
process."  C-68 does not solve that problem; it is capable of many
interpretations.

The reason is evident; if one examines our Paper XXII, excerpts from
"THE GOVERNMENT'S ACTION PLAN ON FIREARMS CONTROL," it is clear that
the entire control system was re-written between 30 Nov 94 and C-68's
introduction in Feb 95.  Hasty drafting apparent ly gave rise to errors
and ambiguity in the language.

For example, FA s. 121(2)(b) forces every currently-existing
registration certificate to expire on 31 Dec 2002, but C-68 provides no
procedure for either renewing the certificates or refusing to renew
them.  CC s. 90 will send you to prison for up to five years for
putting a paintball gun in the trunk of your car.  FA s. 104 and 105
provide for imprisoning a business.

The government is apparently hoping to piggyback all the objectionable
parts of C-68 through on the backs of popular parts.  The popular parts
are a scheme to impose extra imprisonment for possession of a firearm
during a crime, but that concept is also badly handled in C-68.

That penalty already exists; it is section 85 of the Criminal Code,
which provides for 1 to 14 years extra imprisonment for possessing a
firearm during a crime.

Section 85 does not work acceptably well.  In 1991-92, there were
12,287 convictions for violent crimes.  Only 52 of them were under s.
85.  In 100 per cent of those 52, the sentence imposed was the
minimum.

Obviously, the criminal justice system is refusing to use s. 85. Before
enacting C-68, we should ask why.  At all three levels, police, Crown
prosecutor and judge, s. 85 is being avoided.

Why?

Put yourself in the shoes of any criminal justice official. Before you,
you have two criminals.  One displayed an unloaded handgun, and robbed
a jewelry store.  The other wounded three people with a machete while
robbing a corner grocery store. Which man deserves extra punishment?
Why is the law silent about the machete criminal's weapon--which was
actually used?

Continually faced with that situation, police, Crown prosecutors and
judges regard extra penalties for possessing a firearm during a crime
as unfair and unjust, so they fail to use s. 85. C-68 offers nothing
new; it repeats the faulty logic of s. 85.

For 1988 to 91, 28.8 per cent of all robberies were robberies with a
firearm--but only 5.4 per cent of robbery victims injured or killed
were injured or killed by firearms.  That seems unlikely, but Canadian
Justice Statistics prove it.

There are several reasons why you are five times less likely to be
injured or killed when the criminal robs you with a firearm.  Using any
other weapon, he has to be within arms reach. If anything at all goes
wrong, the weapon is used--instantly, because the criminal has no time
available for consideration at such close range.

That is not true if he has a firearm.  First, he is usually farther
away and has more time to consider what to do.  Second, he does not
want to shoot; guns are noisy, and call attention to the crime before
the criminal has an opportunity to escape.

The problem is violent crime, not firearms.  If C-68 substituted
"weapon" for "firearm," it would make better sense.  As it is, its
success in removing firearms--if any--will show up as increased numbers
of dead or injured robbery victims.

Even if C-68 had used the word "weapon," a second requirement is
missing.  The crime should be graduated: weapon present, weapon used to
threaten, weapon used to injure, and weapon used to kill.

The C-68 proposals, in our judgement, guarantee increases in deaths and
injuries among the victims of violent crime.

C-68 pushes criminals away from harmless imitation firearms--and
towards real deadly weapons.  It pushes criminals away from feeble
short-barreled .25 and .32 handguns--and toward longer barreled, more
powerful and deadlier large-calibre handguns.  It pushes criminals away
from handguns, and toward more powerful, deadlier rifles and shotguns.
Is that wise?

The government says universal registration will save lives, because it
forces owners to lock up their guns.  First, locking up firearms does
not prevent them from being stolen.  Second, in most cases the suicide,
accident or crime is the result of firearm use by the person who
normally has the key to the lockup or someone else with legitimate
access to that key.

Third, computerized universal registration will probably result in
penetration of the system by criminal "hackers."  Lists of firearms
owners may target them for burglary or armed home invasion.   They may
also target non-owners as safe to burglarize by night, even when the
family is at home.

The government claims that registration will allow tracing of
firearms.  That is unlikely.  In an Ontario study, Project Gun Runner,
86 per cent of all crime handguns had never been seen by the
registration system, making it useless for tracing them.

With 1.2 million firearms registered, Ottawa receives about 100 tracing
requests per year. "TR1994-9e" says "most" of them are unsuccessful.
If the system says the firearm was stolen from John Brown five years
ago, is that a "successful" trace?  One might want to ask.  The meaning
of "successful" is not known.

To solve a crime by tracing, the police must have the gun but not the
criminal; the gun must be registered to the criminal; and he must still
reside at the address given on the registration.  That is a very rare
set of circumstances.

C-68 seems amateurish.  It is lacking in research support, and offers
little hope of cost-effective benefits to the public.

In sum, the members and supporters of the National Firearms Association
are strongly opposed to Bill C-68.

As I said at the beginning,  Bill C-68 is a political and civil rights
piece, not a Bill to improve public safety.  It gives the public a
false promise--the promise that the Bill will improve public safety.

Ladies and gentlemen, I implore you: Take a long and unbiased look at
Bill C-68 and see it for what it is--a mockery of a Bill--and what it
will become if it is passed.  It is a blow to civil liberties and the
Charter of Rights and Freedoms of every Canadian, not just firearms
owners.  Where the rights and liberties of one are diminished, the
rights and liberties of all are diminished.

(24 supporting papers were submitted along with this material.

David Tomlinson
National President
National Firearms Association